Korean Prostitution Chapter 2

Chapter II American Military Crimes in South Korea and The Military Towns

1. Characteristics of American Military Crimes

According to official statistics recorded by the government, the activities of American soldiers between 1967 and 1998 included over 39,452 overt criminal offenses by 45,183 soldiers in the process of supposedly "protecting the South Koreans."1) In other words, during this period, American soldiers averaged two crimes a day. Crimes such as rape, burglary, and physical abuse committed by GIs were all common staples of the military towns. In the name of necessity, the U.S. promoted a policy, which directly violated the human rights of the Korean people by refusing to punish or restrict GIs for their crimes.

In 1950, with the start of the Korean War, and direct involvement by the U.S soldiers, the U.S. established a series of treaties with South Korea. These treaties were unequal and bestowed the U.S. with the authority to extradite U.S. military personnel who committed crimes against Korean citizens. Therefore, criminal acts instigated by GIs were most often unresolved and the criminals were left unpunished. In 1953, the U.S. instituted the Mutual Defense Treaty, which provided provisions for the U.S. to remain in Korea after the Korean War ended and in 1967, the Status of Forces Agreement was enacted. On the surface, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) offered compromises and reforms to previous treaties; nevertheless, SOFA allows the U.S. to retain jurisdiction in most criminal cases involving American soldiers. The main area of dispute regarding jurisdiction of criminal acts by GIs is section 22 of the SOFA agreement.2) Although the United States military has committed 39,452 crimes (45,183 GIs) between 1967 and 1987, only 234 of these cases were tried in Korea.3) Between 1985 and 1990, Korean jurisdiction of cases regarding U.S. military amounted to less than one percent and according to more recent data in 1998, Korean jurisdiction of GIs criminal offenses amounted to only 3.9 percent. In 1991, although the SOFA was revised, statistics prove the unwillingness for the U.S. to take substantial action towards correcting the unequal relationship between Korea and the U.S.4)

Consequently, despite the fact that the U.S. committed thousands of criminal acts while stationed in Korea due to the unfair SOFA agreement and the arrogance of the U.S. military, only a miniscule percentage of these criminals have been indicted. In view of this fact, it is difficult to measure the full extent of American military's affects upon South Korea. Since neither the U.S. nor Korean governments is committed to punishing the GIs for crimes, such as burglary, physical abuse, or sexual crimes, such as rape and molestation, violators are most often set free without punishment. Of course this vicious cycle must be altered, but the question is, Where shall we start?

In order to accurately gage the negative affects of the U.S. military upon Korean society, instead of basing research upon impersonal statistics concerning U.S. military crimes and the texts of various international treaties, one must focus upon the human rights abuses in the military towns. In South Korea there are currently 37,000 U.S. military personnel that conduct most of their business within the military installations or the military towns. The South Koreans who most frequently interact with the American military are the prostitutes in these areas. Consequently, these women bare the brunt of American military human rights abuses. Ignoring the existence the injustices these women face on an everyday basis will inevitably result in the continuation of these violations.

The majority of crimes committed by the American military in Korea are visible only from the vantage point of everyday life in the military towns. Hence, the social deterioration caused by the U.S. forces in the military towns, such as; GIs who refuse to use contraception and thereby promote the spread of STDs (Sexually Transmitted Diseases), GIs who promise to marry these women and leave without notice, and GIs who physically and sexually abuse these women, must be recognized and thoroughly analyzed. In addition, future analysis of the military towns must account for the U.S. militaries manipulation of the power imbalance, which in turn stimulates social ills such as extreme poverty, rampant spread of sexual diseases, and difficulties faced by Amerasian children.

 

2. Korean American Structural Characteristics and U.S. Crimes in the Military Towns.

After the termination of the Japanese colonization on August 15th, 1945, Koreans expected to be liberated from all foreign interference. However, on September 8th of 1945, U.S. troops entered South Korea and established the American military government. South Korea's dream of independence from outside interference was dashed in a matter of months. In 1948, the U.S. transferred power to the newly elected Korean government headed by Sygmund Rhea (�̽¸�). Nevertheless, until this very day, the U.S. has retained immeasurable power over social and political systems in South Korea.

In 1950, North Korea invaded the South and for three years (1950-1953) the Korean War caused great destruction in which over 4,000,000 were killed. Eventually, Korea and American-led United Nations forces were able to repel North Korea. However, after the war ended, U.S. forces remained in Korea, with the validation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which was instituted on October 1st of 1953. The cornerstone of U.S. policy in Korea continues to be deterrence of the North Korean (Communist) threat.5)

In the midst of the chaos between 1945-1948 many U.S. soldiers, taking advantage of the lawless environment, committed crimes and most often escaped without punishment. Those most affected by these crimes were the military town prostitutes. Prostitution became rampant in Korea as soon as American troops landed in Inchon in 1945 and began the military occupation at the end of World War II. The very first military town sprouted up in the outskirts of Inchon. Korean prostitutes flocked to this region and despite the fact that they could not speak English, they sold sex to the GIs in return for items such as cigarettes, jackets and other items offered by the soldiers.6) The U.S. soldiers committed serious offenses such as rape, physical violence, and even homicide. However, formal records were not kept, creating an environment were the injured Korean citizens could not adequately receive compensation or justice in return for the GIs crimes. 7)

After the Korean War, in the late 1950s and early 1970s, in order to accommodate the U.S. soldiers stationed in Korea, the U.S. initiated a joint effort with the Korean government to modernize the Rest and Relaxation (R and R) facilities around the military bases. As Cynthia Enloe declared, "Military officials imagine male soldiers as men whose morale is sustained in part by social and sexual access to women wherever they are stationed."8) Due to the social chaos resulting from the war, families were separated, children were orphaned and women were widowed. Subsequently, poverty became rampant and leagues of prostitutes were created due to the large number of women left without homes or livelihoods. The U.S military's conception of R & R was the utilization of these women, who lost their families or were in financial straits due to the tremendous destruction caused by the war, as prostitutes in order to keep the GIs morale intact. 9)

The American military used the imbalance of power between the U.S. and South Korea in order to justify the practice of prostitution within the military towns. The American soldiers conception of R and R entailed club hopping, getting drunk and picking up Korean prostitutes. These drunken GIs often became unruly and committed crimes, directed towards the women in the military towns. The U.S. justified the GIs conduct through international treaties, such as the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Security of Forces Agreement and an overtly patriarchal stance, which views military town prostitution and other vices as a necessary evil.

After the Korean War, during the 1950's and 1960's, the Korean government and society responded to the GIs activities in the military town with cool disregard, ignoring the unhealthy conditions in the military towns. From the Korean government's perspective the center of the cold war was in East Asia and the U.S. commitments toward a non-Communist Asia, allowed Korea to maintain political leverage. Thereby, the international environment sanctioned Korea to ignore the U.S. pleas for control of the health conditions in the military towns. As Catherine Moon points out, The Korean government considered camptown(military town) prostitution primarily a U.S. problem and a matter between GIs and prostitutes.10) However in the 1970s, through manipulation of the power imbalance between the U.S. and Korea, the U.S. established a political foothold and forced Korea to make socio-political reforms in the military towns.

Towards the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the U.S. engaged in a battle for political and social power with the South Korean government. In the late 1960s, the U.S. needed Korea's support in the Vietnam War and therefore could not maintain the political power necessary to ignore Korea's demands for financial and military support. However, when the Vietnam War ended, Korea lost its bargaining power and with the institution of the Nixon Doctrine on July 24, 1969, the U.S. remodeled it's security strategy in East Asia.11) This new policy adopted by the U.S. called for 1) the reduction of troops in East Asia and 2) the increase in burden-sharing by its Asian allies. The Nixon administration stated that the sudden economic success of the Asian countries necessitated the institution of a burden-sharing program. The effect of this policy on Korea was a dramatic reduction in U.S. aid. From 1954-1970, U.S. economic aid was cut in half, from $928.7 million from 1961-1965, to $546.7 million from 1966-1971.12)

Although the Korean government did express concern about the U.S. reduction in involvement, they never expected the U.S. troops to withdraw. From the South Korean viewpoint, North Korea was still an ominous threat. In addition, during the Vietnam War, the South Korean President Park Chung-Hee (1963-) provided the U.S. military with 50,000 of South Korea's best troops, and therefore expected the U.S. to support South Korea. However, on March 26th, 1970, the U.S. ambassador to Seoul, William Porter, announced the U.S. troop reduction to President Park Chung-Hee.13) The news of the official 20,000-man reduction in 1971 was undoubtedly shocking to the Koreans.14) By the end of the 1960s there were approximately 62 thousand soldiers stationed in South Korea and by 1971 the US had withdrawn 20,000.15) South Korea's confidence was further shaken by a series of U.S. policy blunders that occurred between 1971 and 1972. Although the U.S. government promised the Koreans $1.5 billion in aid from 1969-1975 to ease the burden of military reductions, in 1972 the U.S. Congress vetoed the five-year foreign aid package. In addition, many high ranking U.S. officials were quoted as calling for a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops by the mid-1970s.16)

The main reason for the power disparity between the U.S. and Korea was the fact that the Korean government needed the support of the American military. In the beginning of the 1970s, the Park administration faced a serious crisis. The reason for the crises involved both domestic and foreign factors. On the domestic front, Park's initial success and popularity due to South Korea's economic growth was threatened when the economy fell into a depression. As a result, social unrest prevailed in South Korea and the Park administration's control was threatened. On the foreign front, the Nixon doctrine seemed to imply that the U.S. was no longer going to support South Korea militarily or economically, which further damaged Park's credibility at a time when his administration was already very weak. In order to maintain control and continue his reign, President Park needed the U.S. military and economic support.

In the domestic arena this power imbalance is played out also in the unequal relations between the Korean prostitutes and the low and high level military officials. Frequently, the only Koreans that American soldiers associated with were prostitutes. These prostitutes were to serve as personal ambassadors to the GIs while working at the clubs. In order to give the American military a positive impression of the military towns, the Korean government, in cooperation with the American military, established the BCCUC. (Comprehensive Plans for the Purification of Foreign Military Base Areas). The BCCUC sponsored programs for the prostitutes, such as, Etiquette and Good Conduct, in order to improve relationships between the military town sex workers and the GIs.

Faced with the prospect of a further reduction of troops, the Korean government bent over backwards in order to accommodate the high-level American officials. High-level officials were thrown kisaeng17) parties, where the main attraction was the prostitutes. On the American side, officials intentionally took advantage of Korean "hospitality." As Katherine Moon, a professor of political science at the University of Connecticut wrote in her book, Sex Among Allies:

"There was a deliberate effort on the part of the Korean government to brown-nose the U.S. military {in Korea} so that they would speak up against troops withdrawals and speak pro-Korea in general. There were kisaeng parties virtually every night that U.S. generals would be taken to It was taejop [general hospitality]. The American military loved it."18)

The unequal relations between the U.S. and Korea forced Korea to take action in order to maintain U.S. support. This led to a new Korean policy, which was called, "people to people diplomacy." Korean officials intended to place direct influence upon high-level American officials through "hospitality," and indirect influence upon the GIs through improving relations with Korean prostitutes.

When the United State's reduced troops and then reneged on financial promises, the relationship with the Korean government became unstable, and more importantly, allowed the United States Forces in Korea to place the burden of military town prostitution fully upon the Korean side. The U.S. military increased its socio-political maneuverability through manipulation of the international relations and the Park regimes' ambition to maintain power.19) Hence, the U.S. was able to interfere in Korea's domestic social and political environment without severe resistance or criticism from the Korean government. In response to pressure from the U.S. government, the Korean government initiated the "Camptown(Military Town) Purification Enforcement Plan" (Kijicho'on chonghwa rul wihan Woemubu Sihaeng Kyehoek: ������ ��ȭ�� ���� �ܹ��� ���� ��ȹ) . Through the BCCUC, the Korean government in cooperation with USFK, "cleaned up" many of these military towns, not on behalf of the prostitutes, but rather for the comfort of American soldiers. Through the BCCUC, the Korean government provided funds for the refurbishing of the military towns, especially bars and STD (Sexually Transmitted Disease) clinics. However, conditions for the prostitutes were nevertheless, unbearable.20)

By law, a prostitute working in the military towns was forced to take and pass a weekly medical examination for STDs. The facilities that provide the STD examinations were created by the BCCUC in collaboration with the U.S. government. These facilities provided only STD examinations and in case the women encountered other medical problems, they were left to fend for themselves. Women who worked in these clubs were required to take the examinations, while women under the legal age, 'streetwalkers' (hipari: ������), women too old to work in the clubs, 'call girls' (Chonhwapari: ��ȭ����) and women who maintained exclusive living arrangements with a GI (kyeyak tonggo: ��� ����) were exempt from these medical services.21) Once the women passed the STD examination, they received a card that certified that they were healthy. The women who worked at the clubs were required to carry these STD cards at all times.22) As mentioned above, health examinations offered by these clinics only checked for AIDS and STDs and not the overall physical health of these women. To mention a few diseases, these women often suffered from alcoholism, drug addiction, and severe depression. Although many of these diseases were introduced as a direct result of interaction with the GIs, the U.S. military offered no medical assistance. Obviously these government-sponsored establishments were not created out of concern for the Korean women in the military towns but rather to ensure that the GIs "R&R" was 'healthy.'23)

In addition, more often than not, the spread of STDs was due to the negligence of the GIs rather than the military town prostitutes. Many GIs would insist on having sex with women outside the bars; that is, younger women, call girls or streetwalkers.24) Moreover, military officials authorized the direct busing of prostitutes onto the American military bases. Army officials used military buses and transported approximately 200 women per trip. These prostitutes were free-lancers and were not subject to the STD tests. Upon the institution of the military clean-up programs, the U.S. military arrogantly charged that the STD epidemic in Korea during the 1970s and 1980s was a result of the women's uncleanliness and not the fault of the GIs. However, even after army officials instituted the STD clinics, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases continued to run rampant and it became obvious that the GIs were the real culprits. The paradox of this policy was that the U.S. provided no programs for the testing or prevention of STD among American military personnel.25) Without methods of preventing STDs among GIs, Korean prostitutes were subject to the dangers of these deadly diseases because of the arrogance and superiority complexes of USFK top officials, who were unwilling to take serious steps towards rectification of the STD epidemic.

Furthermore, the GIs often left the military town prostitutes with Amerasian children, most often promising to marry the women and then skipping town. These women were left with the huge burden of having to support themselves and their children. In the 1950s, these illegitimate two- and three-year-old Amerasians started to appear in Korean society and after the Korean War, 1,500 "war babies," children orphaned because of the war were left to fend for themselves. After the war, through the 1960s and 1970s, the number of Amerasians sky rocketed to over 10,000 and then suddenly dropped again in 1982. Due to the stigma of having no father and a prostitute for a mother, living in Korea was excruciating for Amerasian children.26) In an official census conducted in 1994, only 600 Amerasians remain in Korea, although unofficially the number is closer to 1,500. The decrease of Amerasian children in South Korea is a result of both the adoptions of these children by American families and their emigration to the U.S. 27)

3. Korean & American Relations and Solutions to American Military Crimes

Although the Korean government offers various programs addressing issues concerning prostitutes in the military towns, funds and social workers employed for these programs are insufficient and thus the programs are severely limited in scope.28) Furthermore, programs are designed to benefit the U.S. military rather than the residence of the military towns. For instance, the STD clinics sponsored by the U.S. and operated by the Korean government are established in order to regulate the prostitutes and clean-up the military towns on behalf of the U.S. army, rather than out of genuine concern for the welfare of the women.

In the process of organizing these programs, the Korean government avoids sensitive issues, such as the criminal activities of the GIs and physical and sexual abuse of the women in the military towns. The reason for the Korean government's cautious posture, is two fold: 1) the Korean government in the context of person to person diplomacy, wants to retain stable relations with the U.S. and 2) although Korean officials consider events in the military town an embarrassment, they consider the situation a necessary evil. These attitudes are a direct result of the imbalance of power between the U.S. military and the Korean government and the paternalistic nature of the Korean and American governments.

Unlike the government, nationalist social movements did address issues such as the effects of American military in Korea. However, the focus of these nationalist social activists was not the women in the military towns but Anti-American and Reunification movements. Even though these movements undeniably promoted democracy and reforms, the plight of those living in the military towns was nonetheless overlooked. As Kim Yongja (�迵��), a former prostitute and one of the most experienced activists in the military towns stated, "I'm not saying there isn't a nationalistic paradox. What I'm asking is, even if reunification occurs, will the military prostitutes' situation change?"29) In other words, issues such a reunification and withdrawal of American troops must not be given priority over individual human rights.

4. Government and Non-Government Organization's Counter-Measures

The Korean government's role in military town social welfare is extremely limited. Since the Korean government does not retain the experience or knowledge concerning the realities in the military towns, the institution of social welfare programs within these areas is inconceivable. Therefore, the government indirectly provides assistance to the CB-NGOs by contributing necessary funds to operate programs. This method has already shown promise, with the government funding of programs conducted by both Saewoomtuh and Duraebang.

As for the nationalist student movement, although the negative effects of militarism are clear, and activists have joined the fight against injustices committed by the U.S. military in Korea, the focus of these organizations is often skewed. Cynthia Enloe states that social movements must recognize the special privileges accessible to the patriarchal society. In order to facilitate these ends, the national student movements must disregard the imagery, which falsely defines women in society and join the CB-NGOs in the fight against human rights abuses by the U.S. military in Korea.

Through recognition of the importance of gender and acknowledgement of the effects of the international environment upon individuals, activists in the CB-NGOs are able to understand the larger picture and thus competently provide social programs for the women in the military towns. The staff members of these CB-NGOs acknowledge that the main cause of human rights abuses in the military towns is the U.S.'s propensity to manipulate socio-political circumstances within the military towns of South Korea. For instance, U.S. military has endorsed both political and economic power in attempts to socially control the neighborhoods surrounding the military bases (military towns). In order to better understanding and alleviate these social ills CB-NGO programs focus upon issues pertaining to the everyday occurrences within the military towns, especially issues affecting women.

Women in the military towns face financial, psychological, health, and legal difficulties on a daily basis as a direct result of the patriarchal policies of both the American and Korean governments. In order to confront these social ills, CB-NGOs attempt to deal directly with issues, which arise in the military towns. Therefore, CB-NGOs instituted programs such as counseling, financial aide, medical care, childcare, tutoring for children, work training and work-placement assistance and legal assistance. These programs recognize the immediate needs of the women and children who reside in the military towns. Since these NGO activists witness and directly experience the realities of the military towns on a daily basis, they institute and operate these programs with effectiveness and efficiency.

1 'National Campaign' (1999), op. cit., p.17.

2 Lee Chang Hee (�����), "The Problem with SOFA, Public Hearings to Institute the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea," (Seoul: The 'National Campaign', 1993). P.4-5

3 'National Campaign' (1999), op. cit., p. 17.

4 Ibid., p. 25.

5 East/Asian Women's Network Against Militarism South Korea, Asian Pacific Center for Justice and Peace. 6 Dec 1999. 16 Feb. 2000.http://www.apcjp.org & http://www.apcjp.org/womens_conference_98/main.htm

6 Oh Ji Yon, "Culture of the Prostitutes Who Live in the Outskirts of the U.S. Bases (military towns): Focusing upon the military town in Uijong-bu and Song-san-dong", (Masters Thesis, Seoul National University, 1997), p. 11.

7 'The National Campaign' (1999), op. cit., p. 17.

8 Cynthia Enloe (1991), op. cit., p. 98.

9 Oh Ji Yon (1997), op. cit., p.11.

10 Katherine H.S. Moon, "Prostitute Bodies and Gendered States", Elaine H. Kim ed., Dangerous Women, (New York: Routledge:1998). P.149-150.

11 Jong He Jin(������), op. cit., p. 307.

12 Katherine Moon, Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1997). p.50.

13 Katherine Moon(1997), op. cit., p. 60.

14 Oh Ji Yun (������)(1997), op. cit., p.12

15 Jong He Jin(������), op. cit., p. 305.

16 Katherine Moon(1997), op. cit., p. 112.

17 According to the Prime Korean/ English Dictionary 2nd addition, a Kisaeng (���) is a singing and dancing girl. Prime Dictionary. (Seoul: Doosan Corporation, 1996). p.367.

18 Katherine Moon (1997), op. cit., p.121.

19 Ibid., p. 120.

20 Oh Ji Yun(������)(1997), op. cit., p.12.

21 Kim, Hyun Sun, Lives in Kijich'on: U.S. Military Camptown in Korea (Seoul: Saewoomtuh, 1999), p. 3.

22 Katherine Moon (1997), op. cit., p. 19.

23 Kim, Hyun Sun(1997), op. cit., p.33.

24 Katherine Moon (1997), op. cit., p.142.

25 Jong He Jin(������), op. cit., p.306.

26 I have no dreams for the future. Even in the future, I have no hope of escaping this hell. Every once and a while I think to myself, it would be better if I were dead. While I was in junior high I was constantly forced to listen to offensive language directed towards my mother. And therefore I fought; because I love my mother. I cried almost every night. because I wanted to escape from this environment, I dropped out of school. I am never going back to school. (anonymous Amerasian child)

The Rainbow Center of New York, The Children of Multi-Racial Parents Find Their Future, (Seoul: Jin-Hung, 1995). p.194.

27 Rainbow Center (1995), op. cit., p. 183.

28 Hwang Chang Yong (Ȳâ��)(1998), op. cit., p. 64.

29 Jong He Jin(������), op. cit., p.324.